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ABSTRACT
We argue that for one family of auction models, oral auctions
generate nearly as high a selling price as can he reasonahly expected.
Specifically, consider the case of uninformed risk neutral individuals
who must acquire (at a known cost) perfect information on their own
values for the object being sold before being allowed to bid; perhaps
one incurs costs in travelling to the auction, but once there can
costlessly inspect and accurately appraise the object(s) being sold.
To assure the potential buyers as a whole a non-negative expected pro-
fit, the selling price cannot average above the maximum (over sets of
potential buyers) of the bidders' highest value net of all potential
buyer's costs. Then for a progressive oral auction with a reservation
price equal to the seller's value for the object, at equilibrium—with
respect both to who participates and to how bidders bid—the expected
price of the object falls short of the maximum possible by less than
the effect on the selling price of having one too many potential buyers,
At entry fee (paid to the seller), a reservation price, or a sub-
sidy (paid by the seller) can decrease this gap between the equilibrium
price and the maximum possible. However, the optimal sizes of such
fees, reservation prices, or subsidies depend on the distribution of
the potential buyers' values; the auction must now be tailored to the
specific situation. Still, an optimal fee or reservation price will
not reduce the number of potential buyers below the original
equilibrium number, nor will an optimal subsidy increase the number by
more than one. Thus, roughly speaking, except for the discreteness of
the number of potential buyers, an oral auction without reserve genera-
tes the highest selling price that can be reasonably expected in the
case of risk neutral bidders, private values, and costly participation.

Introduction:
In certain auction node! with a fixed number of bidders, the selLer
would maximize the expected selling price of the object being sold by
setting a reservation price in excess of his own value for the object,
a reservation price that results in a positive probability of not
selling the object even though at least one bidder made a favorable
offer for it. For example, consider the case of n bidders, each of
which knows his own value for the object precisely and knows that the
bidders' values were drawn independently from some cumulative probabi-
lity distribution F(»). Imagine that the object will be sold through a
sealed bid auction with a reservation price of r; in effect, the seller
bids r. The highest bidder wins the object, but only pays an amount
equal to the second highest bid; this second price mechanism approximates
oral auctions. No bidder can do better than bid equal to this own
value, and if all bidders do bid equal to their respective values, this
auction generates an expected selling price of r n (l-F(r)) F (r) +
x=«>
J x n (n-1) (l-F(x)) F (x) dF(x). Differentiating this expression
x=r
with respect to the reservation price r, and setting the resulting
expression equal to zero gives the first order condition of l-F(r) = r dF(f)
for an optimal reservation price. Specifically, for the case of the
standard uniform distribution, the optimal reservation prices equals
one half, and the seller retains the object with probability (1/2) .
(The same first order condition arises even if the number of bidders
were a random variable with some fixed distribution.)
The work of Myerson (1981) implies that no other mechanism that
guarantees each bidder a non-negative expected profit can generate a
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higher equilibrium selling price for the case of a fixed number of risk
neutral bidders with independently distributed, privately known values
(and certain regularity on the distribution of the values) than the
second price sealed bid auction with an optimally chosen reservation
price. A first price sealed bid auction with an appropriate reser-
vation price, and many other mechanisms, generate an equally high
expected selling price. Still, all these expected selling price maxi-
mizing mechanisms result in a positive probability of the seller
keening the object even though at least one bidder made a favorable
offer for it.
On the other hand, practice does not always correspond to the pre-
dictions of this theory. For example, seemingly experienced auc-
tioneers advertise "all items to be sold without reserve," or lobby for
stricter penalties for being caught employing shills—agents, of the
seller, that covertly affect a non-trivial reservation price. Or, for
example, in the early nineteenth century, according to Albion (1961),
the auctioneers of goods imported to the Port of New York, with the
express intention of attracting additional buyers and of increasing the
volume of goods sold, petitioned the State for legislation that would
encourage selling all items offered for sale. It worked. The volume
of trade at the Port of New York grew much faster than at other eastern
ports, even before the Erie Canal opened.
This suggests, at least to this researcher, that the existing
theory must be flawed. Either the existing models fail to capture, or
inaccurately represent, something of importance in practical markets,
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or we solve Che models incorrectly and obtain incorrect conclusions.
But what is the problem? The rules of actual auctions appear simple
enough to describe. The number and types of objects being offered
appear equally simple to describe. The possibility of bidders bidding
to maximize their respective expected profits or utilities also
appears plausible. But what about the actual number of bidders and
how much information they have?
The Port of New York example suggests that the number of bidders
attending a particular type of auction might depend on the auction
type. More bidders might be attracted to an auction of a type in which
the bidders as a whole typically fare quite well, than to a less pro-
mising auction. As argued by the New York auctioneers, the lower the
reservation price, the more attractive the auction, and the more buyers
will attend— the auctioneers hoped to make up through increased volume for
any reduction of profit in individual sales.
The existing theory, for instance as surveyed by Engelbrecht-
Wiggans (1980) and McAfee and McMillan (1985), or as contributed by
Vickrey (1961), Myerson (1981), and Milgrom and Weber (1982), derives
mainly from models with an exogonously fixed number of bidders each of
which obtains an exogonously fixed amount and type of information. A
few models—most notably, those of Matthews (1984) and Lee (1984)—do
endogonise the acquisition of information. However, additional bidders
may mean more than just additional information being present at the
auction. In particular, one of the additional bidders may value the
object more highly than any of the original bidders, and thus the
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market value of the object—as presumably happened with goods imported
to New York— increases with the number of buyers attending the auction.
In fact, Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1986) has already illustrated that in
the case of risk neutral bidders with uniformly distributed private
values, raising the reservation price in a sealed bid second price auc-
tion to the point of loosing a bidder costs the seller more than can be
gained from a non-trivial reservation price. For the case of a Poisson
distributed number of bidders with the mean number of bidders set so
that increasing it further would drive bidders' profits negative, the
optimal reservation price equals the seller's value for the object
being sold. The current paper examines the efficiency of oral auctions
more generally under the presumption that the profitability of the auc-
tion to the bidders might effect the number of bidders.
We start with a couple of concrete, though fictitous, settings in
which the number of potential buyers might reasonably vary with the
profitability of the auction; these examples provide the basis for sub-
sequent definitions and models. In the "art market" example, imagine a
collection of risk neutral art dealers who have certain annual fixed
costs of being in business. Every so often, someone offers to sell a
rare painting at auction. Conditional on any common public knowledge,
each dealer has some private information on his own resale value for
the painting. Each art dealer must cover his fixed costs of being in
business from his profits on reselling paintings bought at auction.
Then, ignoring the costs of becoming an art dealer, or of quitting the
business, the number of art dealers might adjust itself until each
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dealer can still cover this fixed costs, but no additional individual
could become a dealer and hope to cover his fixed costs; the number of
dealers, and therefore the number of potential buyers for art sold at
auction, depends on the profitability of art auctions to the potential
buyers.
Alternatively, in the "estate sale" example, imagine that a collec-
tion of potential buyers regularly scan the local newspaper's notices
of upcoming auctions. A. specific individual attends a particular sale
only if the estate to be sold, as described by the notice, includes
items of interest to this particular individual; this example differs
from the previous one in that only a subset of the potential buyers
actually bid in any particular auction, a subset that will be modelled
as being randomly selected. Assume that until an individual has
expended the time and energy needed to attend the auction, he has only
the same information as is available to all other potential buyers as to
the specific characteristics— and, therefore, as to the value to this
individual—of the items to be sold. However, once at the auction, an
individual may costlessly inspect and accurately appraise each object.
As with the number of art dealers in the previous example, here the
number of potential buyers who scan the auction notices may depend on
the profitability of attending such auctions; those who scan the noti-
ces presumably expect a non-negative net gain from doing so, while
those who don't scan the notices presumably expect a positive loss if
they were to get into the habit.
The next section defines a model of oral auctions with an endogously
determined number of risk neutral bidders and private, though not
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necessarily independent, information. We Chen derive and examine an
equilibrium to this model. The equilibrium set of bidders happens to
be the set that maximizes the net value of the object, in other words,
the equilibrium optimizes the tradeoff between the costs and benefits of
an additional potential buyer. At equilibrium—with respect to who
becomes a potential buyer and to how actual bidders bid— the expected
price in the oral auction without reserve falls short of the maximum
that any mechanism that guarantees bidders a non-negative expected
profit can by less than the effect on the selling price of one poten-
tial buyer beyond the equilibrium number.
The expected selling price might be improved slightly through an
appropriate reservation price, entry fee, or subsidy. The optimal size
of such improvements depend on the situation. But, the improvement
will not decrease the equilibrium number of bidders, nor increase it by
more than one, from the original number. Thus, roughly speaking,
except for the discreteness of the number of potential buyers, the oral
auction without reserve— an auction not tailored to specific cases
—
generates as high an expected selling price as can be reasonably
expected in cases of risk neutral bidders with private values and
costly participation.
The Model Defined
As suggested by the estate sale example, define the following three
different sets of individuals: 1) the set N of potential risk neutral
participants— those who subscribe to the paper carrying auction noti-
ces, 2) the set N of potential buyers— the subset of potential par-
ticipants who actually read the auction notices, and 3) the set N„ f
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actual bidders— the subset of the potential buyers who attend a par-
ticular sale (in the art market example, the set of potential buyers
would be the same as the set of actual bidders). A potential buyer i
has no say himself as to whether or not he becomes an actual bidder; i
becomes an actual bidder with probability p., upon which he pays c , in
exchange for which he sees the outcome x. of a random variable X. . We° 11
write _x and ^( for the vectors (x. , x„, ...) and (X. , X , . . . ) . For
simplicity, we think of there being an x. for each potential participant
i even though only the actual bidders have any use for, or any need to
see
—
their resoective x.'s. Then, let v.(x) denote the expected value,
1 L —
to i, of the object conditional on _X = x_. Although the seller may have
a non-zero value for the object, we can measure the potential buyers'
values with respect to the seller's value, and therefore assume,
without loss of generality, that the selLer has a value of zero for the
object.
Assume that the actual bidders are selected from the set of poten-
tial buyers independently of each other and independently of x_ and the
true state z of Nature. More precisely, assume the Pr(N |N )— the pro-
bability of the set of actual bidders being N„ conditional on the set
of the potential buyers being N. —equals H. , (1-p.) for all N C
I j gN^/N. j I —
N
,
and zero otherwise. For future reference, note that Pr(NUi|N Ui) +
Pr(i\\i|N Ui) = p.Pr(N|N\i) + (1-p.) Pr(N|N\i) - Pr(N|N\i) for all N C N Ui
Once the set of actual bidders has been set, Nature selects the
true state z according to the cummulative probability distribution
H(»), selects each x. , independently of everything except z, according
to the cummulative distribution F, ( • of X. conditional on z, and
l l
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shows the outcome x. to (and only to) i. Note that since z may be the
outcome of an arbitrary random variable— indeed the random variable may
include X as a subset of its components— the X. 's may be assumed to be
— 1
independent of each other conditional on z without any less of genera-
lity in the joint distribution of the X. 's.
Now the object will be auctioned by starting the asking price at
the reservation price r. At each asking price, each bidder indicates
"yes" or "no" to the question "would you be willing to pay the current
asking price?" (A bidder need not be truthful, and may even say "yes"
after having previously said "no" at a lower price.) If no one says
"yes" at the starting price, then the seller keeps the object. Other-
wise, the asking price rises continuously until the first instant that
fewer than two bidders say "yes." At that point the last bidder to say
"yes"—or randomly selected last bidder in the case of ties—wins the
object and pays the current asking price. The auction is over!
In fact, we have yet to see an auction conducted according to these
rules. However, the outcome of an auction conducted according to
these rules approximates the outcome of an actual oral auction.
Therefore, these rules provide an interesting, if implausible, model
of actual auction rules.
Note also that the rules do not specify what any one bidder might
learn about others' answers at each asking price. We eventually
assume that v.(x_) depends on _x only through x. ; nothing that i could
learn about others' x 's would have any effect of i's estimated
J
expected value for the object. While this may be a slightly non-
standard definiton of "private(ly known) values," it captures the
-9-
critical aspects, and we adopt it as our definition. In the case of
private values, it does not matter what one bidder night learn about
others' information through their bidding, so we simply omit specifying
what any one bidder sees about others' bidding.
Finally, to complete the model's definition, we describe how poten-
tial participants become potential buyers. Imagine that the potential
participants line up in order of increasing cost c. Then, one by one,
each individual decides whether or not to become a potential buyer. An
individual, when making this decision, knows who has already joined the
set of potential buyers, and knows the entire model description; only
the actual x and z, and the final sets N. and N remain uncertain.
Presumably, an individual decides to become a potential buyer if and
only if he expects a non-negative profit, net of all costs, from being
a member of the final, as yet uncertain, set of potential buyers.
The "market value" of an object provides a useful yardstick for
measuring the efficiency of an auction. Roughly speaking, the market
value V(N. ) equals the expected value of the object to the bidder who
values it most highly. More precisely, V(N ) = Z Pr(N JN ) E[ max v _ ( x_) ] ,
N
2
CN
1
L jeN j
which we occasionally write as
E Pr(N |N ) / / max V.(x) II dF.(x.|z) dH(z).
N CN, z x jeN J ' ' j eN J 22—1 — 2
Since an individual presumably becomes a potential buyer if and
only if his expected net profit as a potential buyer is non-negative,
the seller cannot reasonably expect a selling price in excess of the
market value reduced by the participation costs of the potential buyers.
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Specif ically , define Che "net (social) value" of the object to be
V(N ) - Pr(N JN ) S c.. Of course, since the net value
1
N.CN. J£N„ J
L— 1 L
value depends on the set of potential buyers, some sets N may result
in higher net values than others. Although the seller has no direct
control over the set of potential buyers, the individuals' choices on
becoming a potential buyer may be effected by the reservation price, or
other auction details, selected by the seller. It turns out that in
our model, the equilibrium set N maximizes the net value over all
possible subsets S of the potential participants.
The optimal ity of the equilibrium set of potential buyers will
arise from the fact that in our model, the marginal contribution of an
additional potential seller to the object's market value equals that
individual's expected profit from being a potential buyer; in his own
self interest, an individual becomes a potential buyer if and only if
so doing increases the object's net value.
To state the pivotal fact more precisely, start by defining
A(x_,i,N ) = max v. GO - max v . ( x_) , which reduces to zero if i eN or
jeN
2
J jeN
2
\i j '
if v.00 < max v
.
(x_)
,
and to v.(x_) - max v
. ( _x) otherwise; for an
jeN
2
\i J
~
x jeN
2V J
appropriately defined second price auction, this would be the expected
equilibrium profit to i, conditioned on X = x_» when bidding against the
set of bidders of N . However, we don't allow potential buyers to
themselves decide whether or not to actually bid—an individual decides
whether or not to join the set N
,
and does so without any private
information, but then Nature chooses N~ from N . Thus, we look at the
expected value of A(X_,i,N ) conditonal on N
,
and obtain the following
theorem:
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Theorem 1: E[ A(X,i ,N
2 )
|N ] = V(N ) - V(Nj\l) for all i in N .
(Note Chat Che right hand si.de Is zero unless LeN.«)
Proof: For UN,, E[ A(X_,i ,N ) |N ]
E Pr(N |N ) / / A(_x,i,N ? ) n dF.(x.|z) dH(z)
N
2
CN
L
l V
z x jeN
Q
J J
E Pr(N |N ) / / ( max v.(x) - max v . ( x) ) n dF. (x . | z) dH( z)
CN z x j eN J j eN Vi J j eN^ J JN
2
_CN _
2
\
Z Pr(N
9
|N ) / / max v.(_x) n dF.(x.)z) dH(z)
N
2
CN
1
z £ jeN 2
J jeN
Q
- I [Pr(N v.|N ) + Pr(N |M )] / / max v.(x) n dF.(x.|z) dH(z)
N CN,
III IV
z x jeL J j eN_ J J2—1 — J 2 J
(using the relationship noted when we defined the p.'s)
= V(N ) - E Pr(N |N\i) / / max v . (x_) n dF.(x.|z) dH(z)
= V(N ) - V(N VI) as desired
On the other hand, for ij£N , i^N for all N CN . Thus, A(x_,i,N ) =
for all x and all N CN , implying that E[A(K,i,N |N ] = as needed to
complete the proof.
Note that so far, we have not used the assumption of bidders being
risk neutral (except to the extent that the assumption may be needed to
make sense of the v . ( x_) ' s not being a function of the true state of
Nature z). Nor did we need the bidders to have private values. In
fact, Theorem 1 follows mainly from the definition of market value and
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of the independence of potential buyers in becoming actual bidders.
Hereafter though, we assume that the bidders have private values.
The Equilibrium Derived
Theorem 2: For any fixed set of N of potential buyers, regardless
of what each bidder i knows about N , N , Pr(N In ), H( •) , or the F.(«|«)'s,
a bidding equilibrium results if each bidder i says "yes" if and only
if v
^
exceeds the current asking price.
Proof: At the hypothesized equilibrium, the price of the object to
i if he wins would be max v.. Thus, the winner's price does not
J£ N
2
V J
depend on how the winner bid. However, an individual's bid does effect
whether or not he wins. But, i makes a non-negative profit from
winning the object at a price of max v., if and only if this price
j eN
2
\i J
does not exceed his own value v. for~the object. Therefore, i can't do
better than to continue saying "yes" until the asking price reaches his
value.
Note that this is not a dominant strategy equilibrium, as it might
have been in a second sealed bid auction. In particular, the benefits
of bidding as prescribed depend on it not effecting others' bidding in
such a way to adversely effect the expected price when i wins. Since
we allow the possibility that other bidders see how i bids, the
equilibrium must assure i that how he bids is not adversely reflected
in others' bids; the stated equilibrium assures that.
Note also that the stated equilibrium would hold even if the asking
price were raised in discrete steps. The steps need not even be equal,
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so long as their size did not depend on how bidders bid. Still, this
gains little realism over continuously raised prices, but has the
drawback of possibly creating a gap between the selling price and the
second highest valuing bidder's value for the object, thereby reducing
the expected selling price and also making the subsequent results more
difficult to state.
Finally, note that at this equilibrium, when i wins, i pays max v.
J eN \i
for an object of value v. (which happens to equal max v.), thereby
1
J eN
2
J
giving i a net profit of max v. - max v.. Then, applying Theorem
jeN
2
J jeN
2
\i J
I gives the following corollary:
Corollary: Gross of information and other participation costs, but
net of anything paid for any objects won, at the truthful bidding
equilibrium described above, each potential buyer i has an expected
profit of V(N ) - V(N \i) as a result of being a member of the set
N of potential buyers.
Now, to characterize an equilibrium for becoming potential buyers,
we need to assume a certain amount of symmetry to the model. In par-
ticular, assume all the p.'s to be equal (to, say, p) . Also assume the
bidders' private values to be identically distributed (say, according
to the cummulative probability distribution function F( •
|
•) of the
value conditional on the true state). This means that V(N. ) depends
only on the number of potential buyers n in N
,
and will be written as
V(n ) hereafter. In addition, although we have not needed to do so
far, hereafter assume all potential participants to be risk neutral if
p is less than unity.
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Theorem 3: An equilibrium results if each individual j decides to
become a potential buyer if and only if pc . _< V(n+1) - V(n), where n
denotes the number of individuals who decided to become buyers before
j ; and if he decides to become a potential buyer and happens to become
an actual bidder, he bids truthfully.
Proof: Once a set of potential buyers has been fixed, Theorem 2
assures that bidding truthfully results in an equilibrium. When all
actual bidders bid truthfully, each potential buyer j has an expected
profit, net of all costs, of V(n ) - V(n -I) - pc
.
, where n equals the
final number of potential buyers. However, as n increases, V(n) -
V(n-l) decreases, while the marginal individual's pc . increases. Thus,
all potential buyers' expected profits decrease with the number of
potential buyers. Therefore, at the hypothesized equilibrium, j ends
up being a potential buyer if and only if j could expect a non-negative
profit from being a potential buyer. Since no individual could do any
better, we have an equilibrium.
Theorem 4: For the equilibrium set N (of the n individuals
with the lowest c.'s), V(N, ) - I pc . > V(N) - I pc . for all NCN_.
l 1 1
—
1 —J jeNj J jeN J
In words, the equilibrium set of potential buyers maximizes the net
(social) value of the object over all possible sets of potential
buyers.
Proof: Follows directly from the previously observed fact that j
joined N. if and only if doing so is profitable, together with the fact
that the expected profit to the last bidder to join N equals that bid-
der's marginal contribution to the net (social) value.
-15-
Theorem 5: If all c. equal some c, then the maximum possible
expected price from any mechanism that guarantees each bidder a non-
negative expected profit will be less than the expected equilibrium
price in our oral auction without reserve when one more than the
equilibrium number of potential buyers participates.
Proof: With a profit of V(n) - V(n-l) for each potential buyer if
there n of them, and with the expected selling price equal to the
market value less the total profit of the n potential buyers, the
expected price must be given by V(n) - n(V(n) - V(n-l)) = n V(n-l) -
(n-1) V(n). Now, at the equilibrium number n* of potential buyers,
pc > V(n* +1 ) - V(n*); otherwise the n* + 1 st potential participant
would have become a potential buyer. Thus, the equilibrium net
(social) value V(n*) - n* p c < V(n*) - n*(V(n*+l) - V(n*)) which
equals the equilibrium price from n = n* + 1 potential buyers.
This theorem establishes the oral auction without reserve as a very
robust, nearly optimal auction. In particular, recall that the
expected price for any mechanism that guarantees each bidder non-
negative expected profit cannot exceed the net (social) value. Thus,
the above theorem states that the expected equilibrium price (with the
equilibrium number of potential buyers) falls short of the maximum
possible expected price by less than the effect of one potential buyer
beyond the equilibrium number on the equilibrium selling price in an
oral auction. Since we cannot reasonably expect real world individuals
to always follow a model's equilibrium precisely, we have shown that
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the shortfall of the equilibrium price in our model from the maximum
possible in our model is less than the amount of variation in the
actual selling price that would arise from real world behavior slightly
different than the model's equilibrium.
Furthermore, we might now expect the shortfall to shrink to zero as
p shrinks to zero (with an offsetting increase in the number of poten-
tial buyers). In particular, for very small p, the expected effect of
one too many potential buyers on the equlibrium selling price will be
very small; the extra potential buyer won't actually be a bidder often
enough to make much difference. (This may explain why auctioneers
incur the expense of advertising what will be auctioned at each estate
sale— the more detail potential buyers have, the more discriminately
each can be. In effect, this drives p down.)
Note that right now, the number of actual bidders is a binomial ly
distributed random variable with parameters p and n equal to the number
of potential buyers. As p goes to zero with n increasing so that the
product np stays fixed, the binomial distribution converges to a
Poisson distribution. The following theorem examines directly the
optimality of the equilibrium selling price in the limiting case of a
Poisson distributed number of bidders.
Theorem 6: For the case of all c. equal to some c and a Poisson
J
distributed number of bidders with the mean number X chosen so that any
further increase would drive bidders' expected profits negative, the
expected equilibrium price in our oral auction equals the maximum
17-
possible net value, and therefore achieves the maximum price that can
be expected so long as each bidder (or, equi valently , each potential
buyer) has a non-negative expected profit.
Proof: The proof first characterizes the X that maximizes the net
value, and then shows that at this X, bidders have an expected net pro-
fit of exactly zero. To start, note that the market value equals
°° ~ A
A
n
-1
j E J xnF (x) dF(x) dH(z) and the equilibrium price equals
z n=l x
°°
-A n
_ ?
/ E
6
,
/ xn(n-l) (l-F(x)) F° (x) dF(x) dH(z). Then, to
z n=l x
maximize the net value, must satisfy the first order condition that the
market value less the bidders' costs of cX, al L differentiated with
respect to X, equals zero. This gives that Xc , = J E —— (n-X)
n-1 z n=l
/ xF (x) dF(x) dF(z). Now, in total, the bidders' expected profit
x
less their expected costs equals the market value less the expected
price and the bidders' costs cX, which in turn equals
°° ~\ n
-1 _?
/ E
,
[/ xnF (x) dF(x) - / xn(n-l) (l-F(x) f" dF(x)
J
,
n ! J J
z n=l x x
- n(n-X) / xF
n_1
(x) dF(x)] dH(z)
00 p~ A
A
n
-? -1
/ E
n ,
[-n(n-l) / xF
n
(x) dF(x) + nX / xf" (x) dF(x)] dH(z)
z n=l x x
00 ~ A
x
n
-i °° -X n _
/ / x[ E / nX F n l (x) - E 6 , A n(n-l) Fn Z (x)] dF(x) dH(z)J
,
n! n!
z x n=l n=2
oo
-X 2 .n-1 oo -12 n-2 _
r ( r ^ e XX n~l, . e X X n-2. . . , , x i - N
/ / x[ E
( n
-Mi F (x) - E ~y F (x)] dF(x) B(H(z)
z x n=l
'
n=2
/ / xX^e [ E — F
m
(x) - E — F
m
(x)] dF(x) dH(z)
z x m=0 m- m= 2 m -
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which equals zero. Thus the bidder's have a net expected profit of
zero at the X which maximizes the net value, and the equilibrium price
must therefore equal the maximum possible net value.
Possible Improvements
So far, the oral auction mechanism has been independent of the
various details of the model. Now, we consider improvements possible
to this basic mechanism if it may be tailored to the specific instance-
that is, if the auction mechanism may depend on p, the c.'s, and the
distribution of the bidders' values. Specifically, we examine the
improvements possible through employing an appropriate fee (paid by
potential buyers or actual bidders to the seller), reservation price,
or subsidy (paid by the seller to potential buyers or actual bidders).
Theorem 7: No mechanism that guarantees bidders a non-negative
expected profit can generate a higher expected selling price than the
equilibrium in our model if the seller charges each actual bidder i,
an entry fee of (V(n*) - V(n*-l))/p - c, or, alternatively, charges
each potential buyer fee of V(n*) - V(n*-1) - c.p, where n* denotes
the equilibrium number of potential buyers.
Proof: Either type of charge reduces the expected profit of each
potential buyer to exactly zero. This effects neither the equilibrium
number of potential buyers nor the bidding of actual bidders at
equilibrium. However, the expected selling price plus the fees paid
to the seller now equal the net value at the equilibrium number of
potential buyers, which equals the maximum possible net value.
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For example, for independent, uniform (0,1) distributed private
values, with p = 1, the market value V(n) = n/(n+l), the equilibrium
price for r = is (n-1 )/( n+1 ) , and the bidders' combined expected
profit net of participation costs equals l/(n+l). Thus, for a par-
ticipation cost c of .04 for each bidder, the equilibrium number of
bidders will be four; for n - 4, V(n) - V(n-l) = .05 > .04, while for
n=5 , V(n) - V(n-l) = .0333... < .04. The equilibrium price would be
3/5, and bidders should expect a combined profit (net of participation
costs) equal to 1/5 - 4(.04) = .04. Thus, charging each bidder an
entry fee of .01 both reduces the bidders' expected profit to zero and
increases the seller's expected revenue to .6 - 4(.01) = .64, which is
the maximum that the net value n/(n-l) - .04n can be.
Thus, with an appropriately set entry fee, the seller can extract
the full maximum possible net value of the object. Note that the
mechanism extracts the full value without exploiting any dependence
among bidders' x.'s, as, for instance, Myerson (1981) does in his
example of a full value extracting auction. However, as with many
"optimal" auctions, both the optimality of the auction and parametari-
sation of the optimal auction itself depends heavily on details (such
as the actual distribution of the bidders' values) of the model.
As an alternative to entry fees, we now consider the possibility
of a non-trivial reservation price. As noted in the introduction, an
appropriately chosen reservation price increases the expected
equilibrium selling price in the case of a fixed number (or distribu-
tion) of bidders. However, it also decreases each bidder's expected
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profit, and might therefore decrease the number of bidders. This
reduction in the number of bidders may more than offset any gain from
a non-trivial reservation price—Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1985) provides
an example illustrating this possibility.
In particular, let N(r) denote the random number of actual bidders
in an auction with reservation price r. Let p (r) denote the probabi-
n
n= °°
lity that N(r) equals n; assume that E
_
n p
(r) = 1 for all r
_> 0.
Note that N(r) may be concentrated at a single n, thereby giving the
case of a deterministic number of bidders.
We say that a reservation price r results in more bidders than a
reservation price of r.. (r_ > r, > 0) if E ' p ( r_ ) > £ _ p (r,)
2 2 1 — n=0 n 2 — n=0 n 1
for all k, with a strict inequality for at least one k. In words, one
reservation price generates more bidders than another if the distribu-
tion of the number of bidders under the smalLer reservation price
stochasticly dominates the number of bidders under the larger reser-
vation price.
Theorem 8: In the case of independent private values, if a reser-
vation price of zero results in a greater number of bidders than a
reservation price of r, a reservation price of zero generates at least
as high an equilibrium selling price in the oral auction as a reser-
vation price of r.
Proof: Define q (r,n)— the conditional probability of a
m
non-negative integer random variable M(r,n) being equal to m given
N(r) equals n— so that N(r) + M(r,n) has the same distribution as
-21-
N(0); the assumed stochastic dominance assures that such probabilities
can be defined. Now, start with an oral auction with a reservation
price of r. If none of the n bidders bid at Least r, conduct a second
oral auction, now with a reservation price of zero, and with m new
bidders (and none of the previous bidders). Clearly, each bidder
bidding truthfully would still give an equilibrium, and therefore,
this (possibly) two stage mechanism generates at least as high an
expected equilibrium selling price as the original one stage oral auc-
tion with reservation price r.
Now, we want to view this (possibly) two stage auction as a single
stage auction. To do so, imagine that Nature first selects a value n
for N(r) and then selects a value m for M(r,n) (conditional on N(r) =
n). Now set the actual number of bidders at n + m. Each bidder sees
his private value for the object and then bids. Then, randomly label n
of the bidders "type 1" and label the remaining m bidders "type 2."
If at least one type 1 bidder bids r or more, the highest type 1 bidder
wins the object and pays the larger of the second highest type 1 bid
and the reservation price r. Otherwise, the highest type 2 bidder (if
any) wins the object and pays the higher of the second highest type 2
bid (if there is one) or zero. In this auction, each bidder has the
dominant strategy of bidding equal to his known private value for the
object, and the expected equilibrium selling price will be equal to
that in the (possibly) two stage mechanism.
Then, the revenue equivalence result of Myerson (1981) assures
that for any fixed n + m (known to the bidders), this latest one stage
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auction mechanism will generate the same expected selling price at
equilibrium as a mechanism with the same allocation rule as before,
but in which the price paid by the winner (if any) equals the second
highest of all the bids or zero if there are no other bids; possibly,
the winner pays an amount equal to, or even greater than, his own bid.
At equilibrium in this latest mechanism, each bidder must bid strictly
less than his own value with some positive probability, and never bid
greater than his own value.
Finally, compare the expected equilibrium selling price in this
latest mechanism—-an expected price that it least equalled that of the
oral auction with a reservation price of r and a random number N(r)
of bidders— to the oral auction with a reservation price of zero and a
random N(0) of bidders (the same number as in the previous
mechanisms). Ml we change is the allocation rule; now the highest
bidder (if there is any) wins. As a result, however, each bidder can
once again bid truthfully. This results in bids at least as high as
in the previous mechanism— and often strictly greater. Therefore, the
second largest bid will be at least as large as before. Thus, at
equilibrium, this final oral auction with a reservation price of zero
(and a random number N(0) of bidders) generates at least as great an
expected selling price as the oral auction with a reservation price of
r (and a random number N(r) of bidders).
Note that the theorem did not depend on many of the details of our
model. In particular, it does not matter how the distribution of the
number of actual bidders arises. Nor need all bidders have the same
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c (it doesn't enter into the proof) or the same probability p of
J J
bidding.
As a corollary to this theorem we may conclude that in our oral
auction model, the optimal reservation price is the one that maximizes
the selling price without reducing the number of potential buyers.
Thus, typically, the seller should increase the reservation price from
zero until either the bidder's expected net profit shrinks to zero, or
until the reservation price equals the optimum for a fixed number of
bidders equal to the equilibrium number for a reservation price of
zero. In no case should the seller select a reservation price so
large as to decrease the number of potential buyers.
The larger the optimum reservation price in our oral auction
model, the greater the chance that the seller keeps the object. Also,
the larger the reservation price can be without driving away a poten-
tial buyer, the larger an expected profit the bidders' must have had,
and the smaller a subsidy would be required to attract another bidder
if the reservation price were set at zero. In fact, in the extreme
case, an arbitrarily small subsidy would attract another potential
buyer, the potential buyers would have an expected net profit of zero,
and the expected equilibrium selling price would equal the maximum net
value possible if the potential buyers' costs had just been a smidgeon
smaller. This suggests that an appropriately sized subsidy might do
better for the seller than the optimal reservation price.
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Theorem 9: In the case of a zero reservation price, the optimal
subsidv (paid either to all potential buyers, to only those potential
buyers who require a subsidy in order to have a non-negative expected
profit, or to all actual bidders) will never be so large so as to
increase the number of potential buyers more than one above the origi-
nal equilibrium number.
Proof: If the number of potential buyers increases as a result of
a subsidy, then the subsidy should be set such that the last addi-
tional potential buyer lias a zero expected profit; otherwise a
smaller subsidy would have had a similar effect on the number of
potential buyers, but at a smaller cost to the seller. Imagine
starting with a subsidy just large enough to attract one additional
potential buyer. The potential buyers will have some expected net
profit (presumably zero if all potential, buyers have the same c).
The seller receives an expected net revenue equal to the net value of
the object less this expected profit. However, when the subsidy becomes
large enough to attract yet one more potential buyer, the net value
drops and the seller's expected revenue— the net value less the
subsidies—must also drop. Thus, the subsidy should never be larger
than needed to just barely increase the number of potential buyers to
one over the equilibrium number.
We close with an example to illustrate optimal reservation prices
and subsidies, and to illustrate that sometimes a reservation price
should be preferred to a subsidy, and sometimes vice versa. In par-
ticular, consider the case of independent private values distributed
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uniformly on Che unit interval. Assume that all potential par-
ticipants have the same c. (say c) , and assume that p equals unity.
Then without a reservation price or subsidy, the n bidders would have
an expected equilibrium profit of l/(n+l) gross of participation
costs. Thus, for 1/12 < c < 1/6, the equilibrium number of bidders
will be two.
The bidding equilibrium to this example with a reservation price
of r generates an expected price of r + ((n+1) - 2nr )/(n+l), and
an expected total profit to the n bidders (gross of participation
costs) of -r -t- (nr + l)/(n+l). For a c just a hair above 1/12, a
very small subsidy (and zero reservation price) would result in an
equilibrium with three bidders, an expected price of 2/4 = 1/2, and
an expected net revenue to the seller of just under 1/2. On the other
hand, for zero subsidy and a reservation price of just under 1/2, two
bidders would have a combined expected profit (gross of participation
costs) of just over 1/6
—
just enough to cover the participation costs
of two bidders. Thus, as c drops to 1/12, the optimal reservation price
rises to 1/2. But even for reservation price of 1/2, the expected
price from two bidders would be only 5/12
—
strictly less than the just
under 1/2 that can be obtained from an appropriate subsidy. In short,
as c drops to 1/12, an optimal subsidy and no reservation price
results in a greater expected equilibrium revenue to the seller than
that possible from an optimal reservation price and no subsidy.
On the other hand, consider the case of c = 5/36. Now a reser-
vation p rice of 1/4 (and no subsidy) would give two bidders a com-
bined expected profit 54/192 = 162/576—more than enough to cover
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their participation costs of 2(5/36) = 160/576. Thus, a reservation
price of 1/4 (and no subsidy) would result in an equilibrium with two
bidders and an expected price of 3/8. But, to get three bidders would
require a subsidy of 3(5/36) - 1/4 (the bidders' expected profit when
n=3) = 1/6. Three bidders would give rise to an expected equilibrium
price of 1/2. Net of the subsidy, the seller could expect a revenue
of 1/2-1/6 = 1/3
—
strictly less than the 3/8 possible with a reser-
vation price of 1/4 and no subsidy. Here, when c = 5/36, even a sub-
optimal reservation price and no subsidy does better for the seller
than an optimal subsidy with no reservation price; in fact this will
be the case for .1160256 < c <_ 1/6, while the reverse is true for 1/12
< c < .1160255. Thus a small change in one parameter of the model may
swing the seller from preferring a subsidy over a reservation price to
the other way around.
Despite this inconclusiveness , we can conclude something of
interest from these last three theorems. In particular, even if the
seller uses an entry fee, a reservation price, or a subsidy to custom
tailor the basic oral auction to a specific situation, the resulting
number of potential buyers need never be less than the original
equilibrium number, nor need it ever exceed the original equilibrium
by more than one. Thus, roughly speaking, except for the discrete-
ness of the number of potential buyers, our oral auction without
reserve generates as high an expected equilibrium selling price as can
be reasonably expected in cases of risk neutral bidders with private
values, and non-zero costs of participation.
-27-
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